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Melamed,  Harrell,  and  Simpson  have  recently  reported  on  an  experiment  which  appears  to  show that
cooperation can arise in a dynamic network without reputational knowledge, i.e., purely via dynamics [1].
We believe that their experimental design is actually not testing this, in so far as players do know the last
action of their current partners before making a choice on their own next action and subsequently deciding
which link to cut. Had the authors given no information at all, the result would be a decline in cooperation as
shown in [2].  
In [1], the authors carried out a large-scale experiment to study the effect of reputation and clustering on
cooperative behavior.  Subjects from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk were placed on different networks and
played  an  iterated  prisoner’s  dilemma (PD)  game  [3]  with  those  to  whom they  were  connected.  Each
participant began with an endowment of 1000 monetary units (MUs) and played 16 rounds. Cooperation
consisted in paying 50 MUs, which involved a payoff 100 MUs to its partner, while defection consisted in
paying nothing and did not generate any benefit. Accordingly, the possible payoffs were T=100, R=50, P=0,
S=-50.
The authors considered two kinds of networks, random (Erdös–Rényi) and clustered graphs, with a initial
mean connectivity <k>=4 in both cases. The clustering coefficients were about 0.167 for the random graphs,
and 0.42 for the clustered graphs. In addition, they considered both static and dynamic networks, and three
different reputation conditions (no reputation, global reputation and local reputation).
In all dynamic networks treatments, at each round, after playing the PD (1st phase) players were allowed to
cut an existing link (2nd phase),  to propose a new link (3rd phase) and to accept or not their new link
proposals (4th phase). In the 1st and 2nd phases, the information available to players did not depend on the
reputation treatment, while in the 3rd and 4th phases did. In the no-reputation condition, the authors write
that “participants were given no information about potential alters’ reputations when adding new ties, which
is akin to replacement at random.” Nevertheless, as stated in their paper, this information was available in the
1st (PD) and 2nd (link cut) phases: in the treatments without reputation, subjects knew the last action of
each of their partners both when choosing to cooperate or to defect and when cutting a link.  The
experiments showed that when people were able to cut and propose new links in all rounds, after 2-3 rounds
the level of cooperation was maximum (c~1) regardless of the reputation treatment.
On the basis of their experimental results, the authors conclude that “while reputations are important for
partner choice, cooperation levels are driven purely by dynamics”. In our study [2], whose setup is closely
followed here except that [2] was performed in a controlled (lab) environment, we found that players decided
on cutting, proposing or accepting links based on reputation, and that they estimated reputation by combining
the last action of the partner and an average of all the available history. When this information was restricted
to the last action, they managed links using as reputation the information about the last action of others (or
more, if previous round decisions are provided), i.e., it was much more likely to cut a link with a defector
than with a cooperator. As a consequence, the fact that actions are known at the time of the link-cutting
decision is a strong incentive to cooperate, as otherwise the focal player has every incentive to replace a
defector with a random player about whom she has no information. Note that the observation in [2] that a
vast majority of subjects cut links with defectors makes very likely that players have this possibility in their
minds when choosing their actions. The availability of information on the last action of players at the time on
choosing actions and managing links must therefore be interpreted as reputation, and as a consequence the
authors are not actually working with a no-reputation treatment.
We  thus  believe  that  the  experimental  results  in  [1],  while  being  of  great  interest  for  instance  when
comparing choosing the same action for all neighbors with choosing independently for each one, something
that  has never been compared in the same setup before, do not  support  the claim that  cooperation may
emerge  without  reputation.  In  this  respect,  only  the  setup in  [2],  with  a  treatment  with no  information
whatsoever, is a truly non-reputation condition, and in that case the result is a rapid decline in cooperation. In
fact, the conclusion in [2] is that reputation is required for cooperation to be stable, but it does not especially
promote it when comparing different reputation conditions, a conclusion that is in line with other   results on
the PD [4], with experiments on the Raub Wessie model [5] and even with the results reported in [1].
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